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PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL THEORY AND
SEPARATION OF POWERS ON THE
BURGER AND REHNQUIST COURTS
Eric R. Claeys*

INTRODUCTION
The Rehnquist Court is widely believed to be the most conservative Court in recent memory. Especially in the legal academy, the Rehnquist Court has a reputation as being conservative
in its politics, 1 originalist in its interpretive commitments/ and
suspicious of the New Deal. Mark Tushnet wonders whether the
Rehnquist Court has shaken the American constitutional order
so profoundly that "the New Deal/Great Society political system
is no longer in place.'' 3 Tushnet is no supporter of the Rehnquist
Court, 4 but many of the Court's defenders and admirers share
the same view. In the most ambitious defense of the Rehnquist
Court to date, John McGinnis insists that the Court's "reflects a
more skeptical view of centralized democracy in an era in which
there is more elite skepticism about the prospects of nationally
mandated social reform than existed in the eras of the New Deal
and Great Society." 5
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University. I am grateful to Saint Louis
University for a research grant and other support making this work possible. I am also
grateful for comments and criticisms by Larry Alexander, John Duffy, Gary Lawson,
Ron Levin, Elizabeth Magill, Sai Prakash, Norman Williams, and participants at workshops hosted by Saint Louis University Law School, the University of Chicago Legal
Scholarship workshop series, the University of Kentucky School of Law, and the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign School of Law. I thank Matt Jagger and Brett Caban
for their research assistance.
I. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Conservative "Paths" of the Rehnquist
Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory
and Consticwional Imerpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994).
3. Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitwiona/ Order and the Chastening of
Constillltiona/ Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 30 (1999).
4. Otherwise he would not have written MARK TL:SHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
5. John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquisc Court's Ju-
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As widespread as this view is, there is at least one good reason to doubt it. It treats Supreme Court Justices too much as
trend setters and too little as trend followers. Most Justices get
their offices by dint of distinguished practice or public service,
not extensive post-graduate academic training. Quite often, they
assume the truth of normative opinions that either are conventional among legal elites when they serve on the Court, or were
so when they went to law school. As John Maynard Keynes once
explained, public officials often write into law political philosophy they learned "from academic scribblers of a few years back."
They do so not "immediately, but after a certain interval; for in
the field of economic and political philosophy there are not
many who are influenced by new theories after they are twentyfive or thirty years of age. " 6
Obviously, no single article could explore this doubt in any
comprehensive way. Yet there is a surprisingly simple way to
demonstrate that it deserves attention-to reexamine how the
Rehnquist Court has treated separation of powers. Separation of
powers law counts as one of the great puzzles of the Rehnquist
Court. Knowing what constitutional scholars knew in 1987/
there was every reason to expect that the Rehnquist Court
would put separation of powers front and center in its constitutional agenda. Word for word, separation of powers takes up
more space in the Constitution than any other doctrine. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia were widely known to sympathize with "original intent" principles of interpretation. 8 More
important, as this Article will show, the Burger Court had left
the Rehnquist Court with several excellent originalist precedents. Later, the Rehnquist Court would change the law of constitutional federalism using the precedential equivalent of whole
cloth. 9 By contrast, at the beginning of the Rehnquist Court, the
Court had all the precedents it needed to launch a sweeping
revolution in separation of powers.

risprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 490 (2<Xl2).
6. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST, AND MONEY 383-84 (1964 ).
7. See, e.g., Symposium: Bowsher v. Synar, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 421 (1987).
8. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989);
William H. Rchnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1955); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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Yet there was no revolution. 10 The Rehnquist Court has declined several invitations to breathe more life into originalism
through separation of powers law. In the process, the Court has
continued a trend that has frustrated constitutional scholars for
years, veering erratically between originalist and non-originalist
interpretive methodologies with barely any explanation. 11 Did
the Justices on the Burger Court take originalism seriously from
the beginning? If not, why have the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts applied originalism at all? Many academics have criticized the Burger and Rehnquist Courts for their inconsistency, 12
but no one has yet explained these Courts' track records convincingly.
This Article explains that puzzle. The Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have used originalism and non-originalism selectively.
Both Courts have chosen one or the other depending on which
better promotes a theory of government this Article calls "the
Progressive theory of apolitical administration." In simple form,
this theory holds that government operates best when the Constitution is construed to stop elected politicians from interfering
with expert bureaucrats. Leading Progressive academics deduced this theory of government from a more comprehensive
political theory of a living Constitution. During the New Deal,
the theory of apolitical administration lost its overt associations
with living Constitution theory and became widely accepted, in
legal education and among leading public-law officials and practitioners.
A broad bloc on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts has continued to use the Progressive theory of apolitical administration
to decide hard separation of powers cases. That bloc has used
the theory to decide whether to apply an originalist methodology
or a non-originalist one in separation of powers cases. Since
methodology often decides results in constitutional cases, this
10. SeeM. Elizabeth Magill, Separalion of Powers: The Revolwion lhal Wasn'l, 99
Nw. U. L. REV. 47 (2004).
11. My favorite expression of frustration comes from Gary Lawson, who complained that the Court was "alternately raising and dashing the hopes ... of formalists ...
who advocate strict adherence to the Constitution's particular tripartite structure." Gary
Lawson, Terrilorial Governmenls and lhe Limils of Formalism, 78 CAL. L. REV. 853, 854
(1990). He concludes that the functionalists won by TKO. See id.
12. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separalion of Powers Juriprudence is so
Abysmal, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 507 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Funclional Approaches 10 Separmion-of-Powers Queslions: A Foolish lnconsislency?, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987); Erwin Chemerinsky, A Paradox Wilhow a Principle: A
Commem on lhe Burger Coun's Jurisprudence in Separalion of Powers Law, 60S. CAL.
L. REV. 1083 (1987).
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bloc has really used the Progressive theory of apolitical administration to decide the merits of separation of powers cases. This
controlling bloc has been quite broad. Justice White was a consistent non-originalist, while Justices Scalia and Thomas have
been fairly consistent originalists. The other members of the
Court, however, have mixed and matched the two approaches.
This group has included Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. More often than not, it included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall. It probably includes Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer.
The Progressive theory of apolitical administration does not
come into play in every case, but it strongly influences cases that
test how administrative agencies relate to the three traditional
departments of government. The clearest test cases began in
1976 and continued through 1992. While the Court has not heard
enough separation of powers cases in the last twelve years to say
with certainty whether the theory continues to control, the available evidence suggests it does. Most of the time, the law under
review promotes Progressive ideals by transferring power from
the traditional three departments to an administrative agency. In
such a case, the controlling bloc of Justices applies a deferential,
non-originalist methodology called "New Deal functionalism" to
uphold the administrative scheme. By contrast, when the law
under challenge seems to flout the ideal of apolitical administration, alarm bells go off and the controlling bloc worries that
Congress is trying to inject politics into administration. The Justices in this bloc then use originalism to declare the law unconstitutional.
This episode teaches two important lessons. The first relates
to separation of powers. The Supreme Court does not take
originalism nearly as seriously as scholars do. Although scholars
disagree whether originalism is a desirable or workable approach
to separation of powers, they do agree that, if the Court were to
apply originalism consistently in separation of powers, it would
need to invalidate most of the administrative state. 13 In reality,
however, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have used originalism in a manner that dedicated originalists would find per\3. See, e.g., Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitwional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
11 (1994) ("There is, however, one overriding problem with formalism as a method for
evaluating current structures. Under a pure formalist approach, most, if not all, of the
administrative state is unconstitutional.").
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verse-only when doing so bolsters the constitutional case for
the administrative state. Not to put too fine a point on it, but the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts have paid attention to James
Madison's opinions about separation of powers only when his
views happen to dovetail with Frank Goodnow, Woodrow Wilson, and James Landis's plans for an independent and centralized national bureaucracy.
The second lesson is relevant to retrospectives that have or
will soon be written about the Rehnquist Court. 14 In one of the
most important areas of constitutional law, a broad cross-section
of Justices on the Burger and Rehnquist Court took their bearings not from conservative political beliefs, not from originalintent jurisprudential beliefs, but from Progressive-New Deal
political theory. Somewhere in their education or practice, the
Justices on these Courts learned to think that the best way to run
a government was to establish centralized bureaucracies staffed
by well-educated lawyers and public-policy specialists, and substantially free from meddling by politicians. If similar connections explain other areas of the Court's case law, that Court has
been much less conservative and much more conventional than
most academics assume.
Before proceeding, let me briefly explain this Article's
methodology. The Article is primarily descriptive. It is normative only to the extent that it uses a theory of government to describe and predict how the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
approached separation of powers cases. This interpretation
could be described as "attitudinalist," in that it presumes that
Justices decide cases primarily on the basis of political preferences shaped by Progressive political theory. 15 At the same time,
this Article concentrates far more than attitudinalist studies usually do on how Justices may have formed their political preferences and attitudes. In addition, the Justices studied here could
maintain with sincerity that they kept their political attitudes
largely separate from their constitutional interpretation. The
Progressive and functionalist ideas discussed throughout the Article could have convinced Justices that sound constitutional interpretation can and should consider the substantive consequences of different interpretations under consideration- in
14. See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 5; Tushnet, supra note 3; Symposium, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 561
(2003).
15. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
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which case they could appropriately have relied on the Progressive theory of apolitical administration while interpreting the
separation of powers provisions of the Constitution. While John
McGinnis has explored a similar approach in his explication of
the Rehnquist Court, 16 legal scholars have not developed this
genre of interpretation as systematically as have political scientists who study the Supreme Court. Ronald Kahn has called this
approach "constitutive," by which he means that overarching
normative ideas "constitute" in Justices' minds overarching but
distinct understandings of law, government, and legal interpretation.17 This genre of scholarship, however, now goes by the name
"institutionalism." 18 As Howard Gillman explains, institutionalists aim to describe the Supreme Court and other public institutions by reconstructing "those bundles of ideas and motivations
that are associated with particular institutions." 19 They do so "in
the hope that [they] can induce with some confidence the reasons that led a particular course of conduct. "20 Stated in institutionalist terms, then, this Article's thesis is that the Progressive
theory of apolitical administration is an especially big stick in the
bundle of ideas and motivations that inform the current Court's
decision making in separation of powers cases.
That said, the interpretation presented here may depart
from institutionalist scholarship in one significant respect: By
surveying the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' achievements in
context of developments from the Progressive Era and the New
Deal, this approach may paint with too broad a brush for many
institutionalists. Institutionalists often prefer to describe motivations and intentions, in Gillman's words, "at a particular historical moment in a particular context." 21 There are sound reasons
to focus on narrow historical context. This Article illustrates the
16. See McGinnis, supra note 5, at 498-99 (while it is "much too simple to say that
the Supreme Court follows the election returns ... Justices pick up the outlines of broad
social theories as they arc reflected in the media" or articulated by leading theorists).
17. RONALD KAHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, 19531993, at 4 (1994).
18. See Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME
COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 65 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard W. Gillman, eds. 1999).
19. /d. at 78-79.
20. /d. at 78.
21. !d. at 79. See also Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, Beyond the lconograph
of Order: Notes for a "New lnstit!llionalism," in THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN
POLITICS: APPROACHES & INTERPRETATIONS 311, 320 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Calvin
Jillson cds., 1994) (''There is no escaping a description of 'the times' in the study of institutions.").
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risk: One must be careful not to assume that Justices on the
Court in the last 30 years have understood and applied the theory of apolitical administration as Woodrow Wilson and other
Progressives did. Progressives tended to understand that theory
as one of several necessary implications of an encompassing Hegelian, "living Constitution" theory of the state, while contemporary lawyers and legal academics prefer to ground the theory in
more technical and policy-oriented consequentialist claims.
At the same time, there are also useful reasons to take a
longer view than institutionalists typically prefer. The main reason is a concern about interpretation. Contemporary separation
of powers doctrine is hard to understand on its own terms, in
large part because it is reconciling deep tensions between Progressive intentions, a constitutional design arguably inconsistent
with those intentions, and pre-Progressive case law demonstrably inconsistent with those intentions. To understand the intentions behind current doctrine, it helps to start with the intentions
of leading Progressives, which were quite clear, and then to interpret current doctrine as an attempt to reconcile the Constitution and the case law with those intentions. 22 This interpretive
approach may in turn produce other benefits for constitutional
scholarship if it bears fruit in subsequent studies of other areas
of the Supreme Court's case law. It may contribute to the study
of Supreme Court history, for its long view may help put the
Rehnquist Court in sensible historical perspective in relation to
the most important constitutional developments of the early
twentieth century. Separately, the long view may provide useful
examples to engage important issues in contemporary normative
constitutional theory. The Rehnquist Court has opened up wideranging debates about the merits of "original intent" and "living
Constitution" approaches to constitutional interpretation. 23 To
appreciate the stakes of such debates, it is helpful to go back and
find points of contact in theory and the case law between
originalist and living-Constitution approaches to interpretation.
In separation of powers law, that point of contact lies in the Progressive Era.

22. I have explored a similar theme in relation to the Commerce Clause in Eric R.
Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism in Progressive Polirical Theory and rhe
Commerce Clause afrer Lopez and Morrison, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. 483 (2002).
23. Compare, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266-68
(lYYl) (proposing a historicist theory of constitutionalism in which the Constitution's
meaning changes as a result of transformational "constitutional moments") wirh Scalia,
supra note 8 (defending originalism).
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I. THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, THE NEW DEAL,

AND APOLITICAL ADMINISTRATION
A. THE PROGRESSIVE THEORY OF APOLITICAL
ADMINISTRATION

Progressive political theory made a huge contribution to
twentieth-century political practice by making popular and respected the theory of apolitical administration. This theory filled
what leading Progressive academics perceived to be a gap both
in American political practice and in the canon of political theory generally. For better or worse, both practice and theory had
focused on questions about the ends of government to the exclusion of questions about the means of government. To fill that
gap, the Progressives proposed that American governments
teach a class of professional experts the tools of social and political control, insulate them from the ruckus of electoral and party
politics, and then leave them rationally and efficiently to implement the legislative priorities that emerged from such politics.
The basic critique was sketched out in a seminal1887 article
by Woodrow Wilson- then a political scientist, and later a president of Princeton, Governor of New Jersey, early leader of the
Progressive wing of the Democratic Party, and ultimately President of the United States. 24 Wilson ambitiously called "the science of administration ... a birth of our own century, almost of
our own generation" -and at the same time "the latest fruit of
that study of the science of politics which was begun some
twenty-two hundred years ago." 25 After asking rhetorically
where the new science administration could be found, he answered, "Surely not on this side the sea," for "[t]he poisonous
atmosphere of city government, the crooked secrets of state administration, the confusion, sinecurism, and corruption ever and
again discovered in the bureaux at Washington forbid us to believe that any clear conceptions of what constitutes good administration are as yet very widely current in the United States. " 26

24. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197 (1887).
This section focuses on the thought or Frank Goodnow, Charles Evans Hughes, and
Woodrow Wilson because they were leading figures and they restated principles generally accepted by Progressive academics and statesmen. For a close study or similar
themes covering other Progressive thinkers, see Nathan D. Grundstein, Presidential
Power, Administration and Administrative Law, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285 (1950).
25. /d. at 198.
26. /d. at 201.
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Wilson turned away from American practice to the canon of
political theory, and here too he noticed a gap. Most political
theory to his day, he believed, had focused on questions of ends
and regimes-what objects governments should undertake, and
which forms of government were best-equipped to attain those
objects. This canon had overlooked a different question, namely
"how law should be administered with enlightenment, with equity, with speed, and without friction." This question of means,
he complained, had been "put aside as 'practical detail' which
clerks could arrange after doctors had agreed upon principles." 27
To remedy this problem, Wilson proposed a science of politics that grafted the administrative successes of European monarchies onto the politics of American democracy. Notwithstanding their other defects, in monarchies, "administration has been
organized to subserve the general weal with the simplicity and
effectiveness vouchsafed only to the undertakings of a single
will." 28 By contrast, notwithstanding their other advantages, in
democracies, "which entered upon a season of constitutionmaking and popular reform before administration had received
the impress of liberal princirle, administrative improvement has
been tardy and half-done." 2 Such a democracy "finds it exceedingly difficult to close out [the constitution-making] business and
open for the public a bureau of skilled economical administration."30 As of his time, democracies had been "more concerned
to render government just and moderate than to make it facile,
well-ordered, and effective." 31 Wilson acknowledged, tacitly
comparing the United States to Prussia, that "(i]t is better to be
untrained and free than to be servile and systematic. Still there is
no denying that it would be better yet to be both free in spirit
and proficient in practice." 32 As a result, Wilson concluded that
"we have reached a time when administrative study and creation
are imperatively necessary to the well-being of our governments
saddled with the habits of a long period of constitutionmaking."33
Wilson and others concluded that the basic solution was to
create a science of administration. Administration would take
27.
28.
29.
30.

31.
32.

33.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

at llJ8-lJY.
at 204.
at 205.
at 206.
at 207.
at 206.
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legislative priorities as a given, issued by the political, electoral,
and legislative processes, and concentrate on achieving those
priorities as rationally and efficiently as possible. The trick was
to ensure that politics shape only the ends of administrationwithout tainting or interfering with the means of administration.
As Wilson explained, "[t]he problem is to make public opinion
efficient without suffering it to be meddlesome. Directly exercised, in the oversight of the daily details and in the choice of the
daily means of government, public criticism is of course a clumsy
nuisance, a rustic handling of delicate machinery. But as superintending the greater forces of formative policy alike in politics
and administration, public criticism is altogether safe and beneficent, altogether indispensable." 34 In short, "administration "lies
outside the proper sphere of politics .... Although politics sets
the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices. " 35
The same themes came out later in the writings of Frank
Goodnow, a professor of administrative law at Columbia and the
first President of the American Political Science Association, the
trade guild for the emerging discipline of political science. 36
Goodnow cited "American experience [as] conclusive" to prove
that "in its extreme form [tripartite separation of powers] has
been proven to be incapable of application to any concrete political organization." 37 Goodnow believed instead that "political
functions group themselves naturally under two heads, which are
equally applicable to the mental operations and the actions of
self-conscious personalities." 38 In other words, "the action of the
state as a political entity consists either in operations necessary
to the expression of its will"-that is to say, politics-"or in operations necessary to the execution of its will"-that is to say,
administration. 39
As Goodnow's comments suggest, many leading Progressives deduced the theory of apolitical administration from a
more comprehensive "living Constitution" theory of political
34.

35.

/d. at 215.
/d. at 21!l.

36. See Dennis J. Mahoney, A Newer Science of Politics: The Federalist and American Policical Science in the Progressive Era, in SAYING THE REVOLUTION: T/IE
FEDERAUST PAPERS AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 250, 252 (Charles R. Kesler cd.,
1987).
37. FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 13 (1900) (John A.
Rohr intro., 2003).
38. /d. at 9.
39. /d. at 9.
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philosophy. Goodnow distinguished between administration and
politics because he likened the state, "abstractly considered," "to
an organism," with "a social mind and a social will." 40 Politics
provided the will, administration supplied the mind. Similarly,
Woodrow Wilson frequently called the American Constitution a
"vehicle of life." 41
In any case, the Progressives drew several specific proposals
from their understandings of the living Constitution and the theory of apolitical administration. They sought to reorder enabling
statutes and structural constitutional law to recognize the fundamental Progressive distinction between politics and administration. The Progressives had four main proposals. First, to discharge Progressive theory's increased conception of social
control, the country needed more administrators. Thus, Woodrow Wilson foresaw in 1887 "a corps of civil servants prepared
by special schooled and drilled, after appointment, into a perfected organization." 42 Charles Evans Hughes, Governor of New
York, Presidential candidate against Wilson, and Supreme Court
Justice, observed: "The equipment of governmental departments
or bureaus to aid in the enforcement of the laws has been a
marked feature of recent legislation." "[I]n order that the bureau
may accomplish the purpose of its creation," he explained, "the
necessity of an enlarged force becomes apparent. "43
Second, the Progressives demanded broader delegations.
They expected bureaucratic agencies to assume the responsibility of generating substantive rules of conduct. Statutory law gets
outdated quickly in the world of the living Constitution. As
Elihu Root, a leading lawyer, U.S. Senator, and Cabinet Secretary to two Republican Presidents, explained, "As any community passes from simple to complex conditions the only way in
which government can deal with the increased burdens thrown
upon it is by the delegation of power to be exercised in detail by
subordinate agents, subject to the control of general directions
prescribed by superior authority. " 44 Before Progressive agencies
like the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade
Commission, and state public utility agencies, Root noted, "the
40. /d. at 8.
41. WOODROW WILSON, CO:--ISTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
167-68 (1911 ).
42. Wilson, supra note 24, at 216.
43. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS IN DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT 35 (1910, Arno Press 1974 reprint).
44. ELIHU ROOT, ADDRESSES ON CITIZENSHIP AND GOVERNMENT 535 (1916).
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old doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative power has
virtually retired from the field and given up the fight." 45 Of
course, the Progressives did recognize, as Charles Evans Hughes
did, that "in the unchecked discretion of legislatures and administrative officers lie opportunities of tyranny. "46 But as most Progressives did, Hughes judged it better to err on the side of action
than inaction. "[T]here is no greater mistake," he warned, "than
to withhold the power to do well in the fear of ill." 47
Third, the Progressives transferred adjudicative functions
from courts and executive-branch departments to bureaucrats.
The Progressives finessed possible constitutional objections by
recognizing a new category of "quasi-judicial" administrative
functions. As Frank Goodnow explained, judicial courts were
not competent to apply law to facts in situations in which "such
performance requires the possession of considerable technical
knowledge." 48 Separately, Goodnow regarded many some
clearly executive functions as "quasi-judicial in character" because they "must be as impartial and free from prejudice as possible,"49 and require "wide information and varied knowledge,"
which "must in many instances be acquired by some governmental authority which is reasonably permanent in character. " 50
Last, and most important, the Progressives demanded that
the bureaucrats be insulated from politics. For the Progressives,
politics and administration were like oil and water. In Goodnow's diagnosis, while "[p ]opular government requires that ...
[a ]dministration must ... be subjected to the control of politics, " 51 it threatens to "hinder[] instead of aid[] the spontaneous
expression of the public will, and hampers its efficient execution."52 Goodnow warned that "[p]olitical control over administrative functions is liable ... to produce inefficient administration in that it makes administrative officers feel that what is
demanded of them is not so much work that will improve their
own department, as compliance with the behests of the political

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

/d. at 535 (1916).
HUGHES, supra note 43, at 44.

/d. at 44.
GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 37, at 75.
/d. at 76.
50. /d. at 76.
51. fRANK 1. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 7 (1905); accord GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra
note 37, at 24.
52. GOODNOW, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 51, at 8; accord
GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 37, at37, 72.
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party. " 53 Of course, one might question whether administrators
are as independent of party politics as Goodnow seems to have
assumed. Nevertheless, if Woodrow Wilson is representative, the
Progressives did not think there was a problem. Wilson was positive that administrators could recognize and implement the will
American people independent of parties or other parochial interests. He assumed it was possible to establish "a civil service
cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor,
and yet so intimately connected with the popular thought, by
means of elections and public counsel, as to find arbitrariness or
class spirit out of the question." 54
The Progressives assumed that two tools would insulate bureaucrats from the political branches. One consisted of legal protections. To protect administrators from the executive, Goodnow proposed to give agency officers a legal "position
reasonably permanent in character and reasonable free from political influence," including "considerable permanence of tenure," similar to judicial tenure. 55 The Progressives also assumed
that the bureaucracy would remain as free from Congress as they
hoped to make it free from the President. Woodrow Wilson, for
instance, scorned the possibility that "those who administer the
law ... shall be in leading strings and shall be reduced to be the
mere ministerial agents of a representative assembly." 56
The Progressives' other tool lay in public opinion. The Progressives hoped to educate public and elite opinion that administration was best kept separate from politics. Hughes proposed
to attract the best and brightest to administrative service by "attach[ing] to the office the degree of honour, which is commensurate with the importance of the work to be performed. " 57 Similarly, Goodnow hoped to foster a "sound public opinion" toward
the bureaucracies. At the end of the day, Goodnow concluded,
the security provided by public opinion "is the only protection
which can be offered to either the judicial or administrative authorities against the exercise of political influences by bodies ...
in the extra-governmental- political-system. " 58

53. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 37, at 82-83. See also
HUGHES, supra note 43, at 34, 45-46.
54. Wilson, supra note 24, at 217.
55. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 37, at 86-87.
56. WILSON, supra note 41, at 15.
57. HUGHES, supra note 43, at 51.
58. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 37, at 45.
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B. NEW DEAL FUNCTIONALISM

Law and public opinion worked together to convert the
Progressives' blueprint for apolitical administration into reality.
By the late New Deal, the opinions of legal elites and legal academics tracked the Progressives' agenda for administrative government. While this article cannot survey this New Deal transformation in any comprehensive way, the highlights are
reasonably clear and have been described by leading historians. 59
To begin with, opinions changed in the law schools. For instance,
as recalled by Louis Oberdorfer, one of Byron White's colleagues at Yale Law School, by 1939 the students were learning a
Legal Realist catechism that held, among other things:
4. Congressmen and legislators are crooks, fools, or both.
5. The only proper way to allocate resources is to create an
administrative agency- staffed by experts- such as former
Professor Douglas or former Professor Fortas. 60

While Oberdorfer (later a federal judge) was almost certainly
poking fun at his professors for their zealousness, it is just as
clear that he learned the underlying Progressive message.
Separation of powers law also changed in this period. Indeed, most lawyers do not appreciate the extent to which the
pre-1900 conception of separation of powers law had receded before the famous showdown between President Roosevelt and the
Court from 1935 to 1937.61 The Court had loosened the nondelegation doctrine from 1900 through the early New Deal. 62 In the

59. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1870-1960, at 169-246 (1992).
60. DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON,THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE : A
PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 153 (1998) (quoting Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer,
''Remarks at the 25th Anniversary of Byron White's Appointment to the Supreme
Court, April25, 1987).
61. This is one of the valuable insights made by G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 94-127 (2002).
62. See, e.g., Fed. Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S.
266 (1933) (rejecting a nondelegation challenge to a radio statute requiring the Federal
Radio Commission to "make a fair and equitable allocation of licenses," "as public convenience, interest or necessity requires"); Avent v. United States, 266 U.S. 127 (1924)
(upholding a transportation statute to prescribe rules to break emergency rules for railroads when "reasonable" and "in the interest of the public and of commerce"); Buttfield
v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904) (rejecting a nondelcgation challenge to a law making it
illegal "to import or bring into the United States any merchandise as tea which is inferior
in purity, quality, and fitness" in relation to standards for the same promulgated by the
Secretary of the Treasury).
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1932 case Crowell v. Benson, 63 the Court legitimized the practice
of allowing administrative agencies to conduct arguably Article
III adjudications when it upheld against constitutional challenge
large portions of a maritime workers'-compensation scheme. In
the 1936 case, Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 64 the Court
upheld against an Article II challenge the constitutionality of
FTC commissioners. The Court's decision handed President
Roosevelt a significant political defeat, but to do so the Court
wrote Frank Goodnow's constitutional theory of separation of
powers into the U.S. Reports. The Court upheld the FTC's enabling act on the ground that the FTC's commissioners exercised
not "executive power in the constitutional sense," but "quasilegislative or quasi-judicial powers." 65
Of course, the New Deal Court also seemed to break with
the Progressive blueprint when it endorsed the non-dele§ation
doctrine in A. L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp- v. United States 6 and
then again in Panama Oil Co. v. Ryan. 6 Schechter Poultry and
Panama Ryan were the first two cases in which the Supreme
Court used the non-delegation doctrine to strike down acts of
Congress. 68 But in the context of Crowell, Humphrey's Executor,
and especially the trend in nondelegation law, these two decisions were extreme cases. Both considered challenges to the National Industrial Recovery Act, in which Congress had given the
President broad latitude to certify codes of fair competition for a
wide range of American industries. Shortly after Panama Ryan
and Schechter Poultry, the Court upheld other New Deal laws as
against non-delegation challenges. 69 In light of the deferential
cases before and after, Schechter Poultry and Panama Ryan
quickly came to be understood as standing for the proposition
that Congress violates the non-delegation doctrine only when it
gives the President a blank check over most of the economy in a
single legislative act. 70
63. 285 u.s. 22 (1932).
64. 295 u.s. 602 (1936).
65. /d. at 628-29.
66. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
67. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
68. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 370
(2002).
69. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding a delegation
authorizing "fair and equitable" price controls); National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding a delegation to issue broadcast licenses when doing so promotes the "public interest, convenience, or necessity").
70. Accord GARY LAWSON, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 101-02 (3d ed. 2004).
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These New Deal cases laid the basis for a new, nonoriginalist narrative in separation of powers law. This narrative
now goes by the name of "functionalism." To avoid confusing
this specific narrative with the general category of functionalist
interpretive theory, this article will refer to the narrative as
"New Deal functionalism." 71 New Deal functionalism differed
from the Progressive theory of apolitical administration in at
least two respects. It did not appeal to overarching ideas about a
"living Constitution" as the central idea from which specific
separation of powers prescriptions emanated. In addition, it did
not attack head-on pre-1900 understandings of separation of
powers, as Frank Goodnow had when he concluded that tripartite separation of powers "has been proven to be incagable of
application to any concrete political organization," or as
Woodrow Wilson had when he complained that the Framers had
had "no clear analysis of the matter in their own thoughts" when
they wrote the Constitution to implement Montequieu's ideas
about separation of powers. 73 Rather, New Deal functionalism
respected tripartite separation of powers in broad form and then
made the law significantly more deferential and proadministration in the details. It converted separation of powers
law from a fairly rulebound exercise into a process of balancing
competing interests. The balance weighed interests depending
on how well they accorded with the Progressive theory of apolitical administration.
The transition is apparent in James Landis's 1938 book, The
Administrative Process, an influential attempt by a leading academic to articulate the constitutional case for administrative
agencies. Like the Progressives, Landis assumed that the object
of constitutional interpretation was "to adapt governmental
technique ... to modern needs." 74 Like the Progressives, Landis
also attributed the adaptation in the early twentieth century to
such factors as "the growing interdependence of individuals,"
"[t]he rise of industrialism and the rise of democracy." 75 Like the
Progressives, Landis insisted that courts ought to defer to this
71. For one useful restatement of general functionalist tenets, sec Thomas W.
Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. Cf. REV. 225,
229-35. For a more comprehensive defense of functionalism in separation of powers, sec
Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
72. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 37, at 13.
73. WILSON, supra note 41, at 55.
74. JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1 (1938).
75. /d. at 7.
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transformation out of a recognition of the "inadequacy of the judicial ... process[]." 76 Unlike the Progressives, however, Landis
did not deduce any of these prescriptions from a living Constitution or an organic national will. 77 Each prescription was a practical, technical, and superficially apolitical response to the exigencies of regulating a national economy in an encompassing
national democracy.
II. POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION ON THE
BURGER AND REHNQUIST COURTS
A. BUCKLEY: COOPTING ORIGINAL-INTENT FORMALISM

By the 1970s, this combination of Progressive ends and New
Deal methodological means became widely accepted among most
Justices, academics, and other leading public lawyers. New Deal
functionalist methodology kept the Supreme Court's separation
of powers law in accord with Progressive ends after the New
Deal. For instance, in the 1958 case Wiener v. United States, the
Court restated Humphrey's Executor to allow the President to
fire "core" executive officers at will, but also to allow Congress
to shield "administrative" or "quasi-judicial" executive officers
from removal. 78 The Supreme Court bucked the functionalist
trend on occasion. In the 1952 decision Youngstown v. Sawyer,
for example, the Court declared illegal an attempt by President
Truman to seize U.S. steel mills under his powers as commander
in chief without any specific statutory authorization. 79 Like Panama Oil and Schechter Poultry, however, Youngstown v. Sawyer could be read narrowly, for the proposition that the Court
would invoke originalist separation of powers ideas only when
necessary to stop the President from governing the entire U.S.
economy without congressional supervision.
However, in the 1970s, two important conditions changed:
Activist conservative courts no longer represented a major
threat to the Progressive blueprint for apolitical administration,
and Congress became a threat in its own right. To appreciate
76. !d. at 46.
77. See Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Consricution of Change: Legal Fundamenrality Wichout Legal Fundamenralism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 56 (1993) (expressing
surpnse that "the progressive elaboratiOn of a theory of a changing constitution ...
ground to a halt after 1937").
78. 357 u.s. 349 (1958).
79. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). I thank Joel Goldstein for convincing me to consider
Youngsrown v. Sawyer.
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that new threat, consider the law challenged in the 1976 decision
Buckley v. Valeo. 80 Buckley challenged the composition of the
Federal Election Commission. Four of the eight officers were
appointed by the leaders of the House and Senate, and the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House held two more
seats ex officio. 81 Politically, the FEC scheme represented an important precedent against the separation of politics and administration. The FEC enjoyed the full panoply of powers traditionally enjoyed by administrative agencies-the powers to make
legislative rules, prosecute violations of its organic statute and
rules, and adjudicate those prosecutions, subject to limited judicial review. 82 If Congress could appoint the FEC's officers, there
was no principled reason why Congress could not assume the
power to appoint every other agency's officers.
The FEC Act forced the Court to make a choice between
political ends and interpretive means. One easy way to invalidate
the Act was to revive originalist principles of interpretation in
separation of powers law. But the Court could not do so without
reopening the many questions about judicial activism and judicial review that the New Deal had settled. On the other hand, if
the Court applied New Deal functionalism, it would have been
extremely difficult for the Court to invalidate a law in which
Congress was asserting its political will over an administrative
agency.
The Court sided with Progressive government theory. In
Buckley, the Court invalidated the FEC Act by resuscitating
originalism-or, as the rest of this Article will describe it, "original intent formalism." This approach is "formalistic" because, as
Thomas Merrill explains, it "insists that the structural provisions
of the Constitution establish a set of rules-an 'instruction manual'- that must be followed whatever the consequences. " 83 This
formalism is an "original-intent" formalism because the original
meaning of the Constitution supplies the instructions in that socalled manual. In Buckley, the Court appealed to original meaning by insisting that "[t]he principle of separation of powers was
not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted in Phila-

80.
81.
82.
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u.s. 1 (1976).

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 113.
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 111-112.
83. Merrill, supra note 71, at 230 (quoting Gary Lawson, In Praise of Woodenness,
11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 21, 22 (1988)).
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delphia in the summer of 1787. " 84 Read formalistically, since the
appointments clause specifically authorizes only the President,
the heads of departments, and the courts of law to appoint offi85
cers, it implicitly withholds that power from Congress. The
Court acknowledged that Congress might have "had good reason for not vesting in a Commission composed wholly of Presidential appointees the authority to administer the act," but it
formalistically insisted that any such reasons "do not by themselves warrant a distortion of the Framers' work." 86
As these quotations suggest, at a superficial level Buckley's
holding seems not to rely on policy at all. Below the surface,
however, the decision relies heavily on Progressive norms about
apolitical expertise. Buckley's holding created tensions with such
separation of powers precedents as Crowell and Humphrey's Executor. Again, the FEC's commissioners exercised standard
agency rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative powers. Since
the Court expressed keen interest in what the Framers had said
about the appointments clause issue, perhaps the Court might
also have considered what the Framers had said about modern
administrators. Publius, after all, had assumed in passing that the
notion of indeJ?endent, non-partisan administration was a "political heresy." He declared emphatically that the combination
of government functions in one officer is "the very definition of
tyranny." 88 The Court did not appeal to Publius's authority on
these points, however. The Court held that the FEC's rulemaking, prosecutorial, and adjudicative powers were innocuous, "of
kinds usually performed by independent regulatory agencies." 89
Such powers, the Court suggested, were best "exercised free
from day-to-day supervision of either Congress or the Executive
Branch," and "essential to effective and impartial administration
of the entire substantive framework of the Act." 90

Buckley,424 U.S. at 124.
See U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125-26.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 134.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 379, 382 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. &
R. Kesler intro., 1999); see also Charles R. Kesler, Separation of Powers and the
Administrative State, in THE IMPERIAL CONGRESS 20, 23-31 (Gordon Jones & John
84.
85.
86.
87.
Charles

Marini eds., 1989).
88. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 87, at 268, 269 (Madison).
89. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140-41.
90. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140-41.
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B. PROGRESSIVE THEORY AND ARTICLE III

Buckley's distinction gradually hardened throughout the
rest of the Burger Court and the early years of the Rehnquist
Court. It surfaced next in a series of cases about the relationship
between Article III courts and administrative agencies. A Court
plurality embraced original-intent formalism in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 91 In Northern
Pipeline, the Court invalidated provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1978 that vested the power to hear bankruptcy cases and related state lawsuits in bankruptcy courts staffed by judges who
lacked Article III tenure or salary guarantees. 92 Northern Pipeline did not directly threaten the Progressive blueprint of apolitical administration. The bankruptcy provisions at issue threatened the Article III judiciary's integrity, because they
transferred arguably Article III business to non-Article III
judges. 93 Even so, Northern Pipeline threatened to upset that
Progressive blueprint indirectly. If the Court had applied the
plurality's rule of decision to any scheme providing for administrative adjudication, it would have needed to discredit Crowell
and declare the scheme unconstitutional.
The Court thus hastened to limit Northern Pipeline in subsequent cases involving agency adjudication. In Thomas v. Union
Carbide, 94 the Court considered a challenge to a law authorizing
the EPA to order binding arbitration in proceedings meant to
compensate ~esticide makers for compelled disclosure of their
trade secrets. 5 Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor declined
to strike the scheme down. If the Court invalidated the arbitration scheme, she worried, "the constitutionality of many quasiadjudicative activities carried on by administrative agencies involving claims between individuals would be thrown into
doubt." 96
Justice O'Connor reaffirmed New Deal functionalism in
CFTC v. Schor. 97 In Schor, the Court upheld a scheme authorizing Commodities Futures Trading Corporation administrative
91. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).
92. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53-54 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.)
93. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).
94. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
95. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 573.
96. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist,
and Powell joined O'Connor in Thomas. Justice Stevens concurred separately to decide
the case on a waiver issue; Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall concurred separately to distinguish the case more narrowly from Northern Pipeline.
97. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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law judges ("ALJs") to adjudicate suits and state-law counterclaims arising from the violation of Commodities Exchange Act
regulations. Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor framed
Schor's Article III challenge as a balance of competing policy interests. O'Connor then gave the competing interests the weights
specified in Progressive political theory. She deferred heavily to
the purpose of the law, "to create an inexpensive and expeditious alternative forum through which customers could enforce
the provisions of the CEA. " 98 She placed great weight on avoiding the possibility that the Court might "unduly constrict Con99
gress' ability to take needed and innovative action." On the
other side, O'Connor did not worry that the Commission's ALJs
might be more political than juries and state and Article III
courts. She took at face value a claim in a congressional report
that "the CFfC was relative!~ immune from political pressure
and [had] obvious expertise."' 0
C. PROGRESSIVE THEORY IN ARTICLE I
The formalist revival erupted next in Article I. The 1983
case of INS v. Chadha 101 challenged a "legislative veto" provision. The Immigration and Naturalization Act gave the Attorney
General power to suspend the deportations of aliens not lawfully
in the United States if the aliens satisfied certain criteria, but it
also reserved to each house of Congress the power to reverse
102
such suspensions and thereby to reinstate the deportations.
Like the appointments scheme challenged in Buckley, the legislative veto directly threatened the ideal of apolitical administration. Policymaking was apolitical as long as Congress delegated
regulatory powers to agencies and then left the agency to make
the final decision. Policymaking became political, however, if
Congress kept a veto hanging over the agency's decision.
Nevertheless, the Court declared the legislative veto unconstitutional because it threatened the ideal of apolitical administration. A solid majorit¥ of the Court embraced an originalintent formalist analysis.' 3 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
98. !d. at 855.
99. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
100. /d. at 855-56 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-975, pp. 44,70 (1974)).
101. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
102. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 924-25.
103. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor joined Chief
Justice Burger's opinion for the Court. Justice Powell concurred separately to decide the
case on Article III grounds. See id. at 959 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice White dis-
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Burger reasoned that the veto of an agency action counted as an
exercise of "legislative Power" under Article I. This legislative
act, however, was not endorsed by the President or both Houses
of Con~ress, as required by the presentment and bicameralism
04
clauses. Chief Justice Burger brushed aside functionalist policy
arguments for the veto: "[T)he fact that a given law or procedure
is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution." 105 As had the per curiam Court opinion in Buckley, Burger's majority opinion in Chadha stressed what one
Framer had called the "'danger of a Legislative despotism."' 106
Burger cited The Federalist for the principle that bicameralism
and presentment "establish[) a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects
of faction,grecipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good." 1 Chadha was especially telling because the legislative
veto was not a constitutional novelty. As the Court noted, as of
1983 Congress had inserted nearly 300 legislative-veto provisions
into administrative statutes, many during the New Deal. 108 If the
Court's separation of powers law had been motivated by the intention not to disturb administrative institutions with a solid
pedigree in history and practice, the Court should have upheld
the legislative veto.
Chadha could plausibly have been read to signal that the
Court would embrace formalism and broadly throughout separation of powers law. The simplest way to test this view was to ask
whether the Court would start applying the interpretive approach of Chadha, a formalist Article I case, to the main Article
I doctrine, the nondelegation doctrine. Tellingly, Chadha itself
scntcd on New Deal functionalist grounds, arguing that the legislative veto represented a
sound response to the problems created by broad administrative delegations. See id. at
967 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist Uoined by Justice White) agreed with the
Court's analysis of the legislative veto but concluded it required the Court to declare not
only the veto but the entire deportation scheme unconstitutional. See id. at 1013
(Rchnquist, J ., dissenting).
104. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 7; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951-59.
105. Chadha, 462 U.S. at944.
106. !d. at 949 (quoting 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 254 (quoting James Wilson)); see also id. at 949-50 (quoting
Alexander Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 and Joseph Story in COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION).
107. !d. at948 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at458 (Hamilton)).
108. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944-45 (quoting James Abouresk, The Congressional

Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives,
52 IND. L. REV. 323, 324 (1977), and citing Justice White's list of the acts implicated in
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1!Kl3-13 (White, J., dissenting)).
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discouraged this approach-on the authority of the Progressive
theory of apolitical administration. In Chadha, Congress had
made a plausible nondelegation argument in its brief. By the
Court's own formalistic definition of "legislative power," Congress argued, the power to suspend deportations was just as "legislative" as the power to veto the suspension. If the Court were
set on formalism, it would need to explain why the Attorney
General, an executive officer, could exercise legislative power
without raising nondelegation problems. Not so, held the Court.
That question raised "only a question of delegation doctrine,"
and "Congress' authority to delegate portions of its power to
administrative agencies provides no support for the argument
that Congress can constitutionally control administration of the
laws by way of a congressional veto." 109
As the evidence rolled in after Chadha, it became clear that
the Court still subscribed to the New Deal's functionalist rendition of nondelegation doctrine. The clearest sign of the trend
came in the 1989 decision Mistretta v. United States, 110 which upheld the U.S. Sentencing Commission's powers to promulgate
legislative formulas for federal district courts to follow in criminal sentencings. Unlike the legislative veto, the Sentencing
Commission was a constitutional novelty in an important respect. The standard-issue administrative agency makes legislative rules on behalf of or in place of the President; the Sentencing Commission promulgates such rules for Article III courts.
That difference made the Commission enough of a constitutional
sport for the Court to attack the Commission if it so desired.
Nevertheless, in the Court's mind, Congress's delegation to the
Commission raised essentially the same policy issues as any
other delegation to any other agency. 111 Thus, in a majority opinion joined by everyone except Justice Scalia, Justice Blackmun
restated nondelegation doctrine in classic New Deal functionalist
terms. Blackmun distinguished Chadha on legislative-usurpation
grounds, recognizing that Congress may not "exercise the responsibilities of other Branches or ... reassign powers vested by
the Constitution." 112 In all other cases, however, Mistretta signaled that courts should uphold delegations as long as "Congress
109. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953-54 n.l6.
110. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
Ill. See id. at 371 (calling the Commission "an independent Sentencing Commission"). I am grateful to John Duffy for insisting that I highlight the contrast between the
legislative veto in Chadha and the Sentencing Commssion in Mistretta.
112. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382.
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clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is
to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority. " 113
As Justice O'Connor had in Thomas and Schor, Justice
Blackmun balanced the competing policy interests in Mistretta
with Progressive eyes and thumbs. Since Chadha had cited The
Federalist Papers as controlling authority, perhaps Mistretta
could have taken judicial notice that Publius had defined "law"
as "a rule of action" and asked rhetorically, "how can that be a
rule, which is little known, and less fixed?" 114 In Mistretta, however, Justice Blackmun cited Progressive policy arguments as authoritative. The nondelegation doctrine, he explained, "has been
driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to
delegate power under broad general directives." 115 Since the
Commission gave the judiciary power over both rulemaking and
rule application in sentencing, perhaps Justice Blackmun could
have considered Publius's and Montesquieu's warning that
"there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive
powers are united in the same person, or body ofmagistrates." 116
Justice Blackmun declined, stating that the Court has often "upheld statutory provisions that to some extent commingle the
functions of the Branches." 117
D. PROGRESSIVE THEORY AND ARTICLE II
The Burger and early Rehnquist Courts also applied New
Deal functionalism and original-intent formalism selectively in
Article II removal cases. Removal law had settled in a function-

113. /d. at 372-73. Justice Scalia dissented on the formalist ground that the Sentencing Guidelines scheme unconstitutionally authorized judicial officials to make legislative
rules outside of the course of exercising their Article Ill "judicial power" to decide cases.
See id. at 416-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, Scalia did reject Mistretta's nondelegation challenge. Scalia disagreed with the majority because he thought there does exist a
non-delegation doctrine, but he thought it a doctrine "not readily enforceable by the
courts." /d. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's opinion is revealing because it shows
that he is sometimes more attached to a functionalist theory of judicial minimalism than
he is to original-intent interpretation. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). These tensions go beyond the scope of this article;
I have explored them in relation to Scalia's takings jurisprudence in Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 187,220-29 (2004).
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, supra note 87, at 344,349 (Madison).
115. /d. at 372.
116. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 87, at 270 (Madison) (internal quotations
omitted).
117. /d.
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alist pattern after Humphrey's Executor in 1935 and Wiener in
118
1958, but the Burger Court unsettled it in Bowsher v. Synar.
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act assigned the removal power to Congress, not the President. The
relevant provisions required the Comptroller General to determine whether the federal budget deficit exceeded statutory targets and what budget cuts would reduce the deficit beneath the
target. The Comptroller General's determinations triggered
automatic se9uestrations unless Congress made equivalent
spending cuts. 19 Unlike the agency officers at issue in Humphrey's Executor and Wiener, the Comptroller is removable by a
joint resolution of Congress. 120 Although the Comptroller does
have "good cause" protections similar to those protecting agency
commissioners and administrators, 121 the Court pointedly noted
that Congress was not willing to concede during the Bowsher
litigation that these 5ood-cause provisions were enforceable in
an Article III court. 2 The most important feature of the Act
was that Congress, and not the President, was exercising the removal power.
The Balanced Budget Act created a threatening precedent
for apolitical administration. While the Comptroller General is
not an ordinary administrator, the Comptroller's responsibility
to prepare binding budget estimates was executive, like the
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions of many agencies. 123 If
Congress could constitutionally arrogate the power to fire the
Comptroller, it could cite the Balanced Budget Act as precedent
for rewriting many agency enabling statutes to assume for itself
the power to fire agency officers.
The Court thus switched to original-intent formalism. (Bowsher was particularly ironic because it was handed down on the
same day as the very functionalist Schor decision, discussed
above in part II.C. 124 ) Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger invalidated the challenged provisions of the Balanced
Budget Act on formalist grounds. "Congressional control over
118. 478 u.s. 714 (1986).
119. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 718.
120. See id. 478 U.S. at 728.
121. Seeid. (citing31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)(B)).
122. !d.
123. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-34.
124. July 7, 1986. Compare id. at 714 with CITC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Rehnquist joined both majority opinwns, and Justice Stevens JOined the Court's functionalist opinion in Schor and wrote a
separate formalist concurrence in Bowsher.
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the execution of the laws," the Burger insisted, "is constitutionally impermissible." 125 The Court also appealed to original intent. It quoted the warning from Publius and Montesquieu that it
would disregard a few years later in Mistretta, that '"there can be
no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united
in the same person, or body of magistrates.'" 126 Because this
overriding threat to liberty was coming from Congress rather
than from an agency, the Court applied the standard formalist
syllogism: Congress's control over the tenure of the Comptroller
General made the Comptroller a legislative official; the Comptroller's balanced-budget responsibilities were executive; and
therefore, because the official was not performing the functions
of his branch, the relevant portions of the Act violated the separation of powers. 127
The Court reversed course and limited Bowsher's reach a
few years later in Morrison v. Olson. 128 Morrison rejected a challenge to the provisions of the Ethics in Government Act establishing the Office of Independent Counsel, which protected independent counsels from removal except for good cause. 129
Morrison, however, was not a test case of the Progressive theory
of apolitical administration. The Independent Counsel's prosecutorial powers were clearly "core executive" powers, not administrative, "quasi-judicial" powers. Perhaps the Court was motivated by concerns similar to the concerns that motivated
Panama Oil, Schechter Poultry, and Youngstown v. Sawyer: here,
a desire that no future President hold himself above the law as
President Nixon had when he fired the special counsel investigating Watergate. 130 Perhaps, as Michael Rappaport speculates,
Morrison was decided as it was "because elite liberal opinion
and some of the general public regarded the independent counsel as essential to good government." 131 Even so, Morrison conBowsher, 478 U.S. at 726-27.
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722.
See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727-34. Chief Justice Burger wrote the Court opinion
for himself and Justices Brennan, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justices Stevens and
Marshall concurred separately to decide the case on a different formalist ground, that the
Comptroller General could not rescind funds without Congress's following the bicameralism and presentment clauses. See id. at 736 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justices White,
see id. at 759 (White, J., dissenting), and Blackmun, see id. at 776 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) dissented separately to uphold the balanced-budget act on New Deal functionalist
grounds.
128. 487 u.s. 654 (1988).
129. See id. at 663-64 (citing 28 U.S. C. 596).
130. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
131. Michael B. Rappaport, It's the O'Connor Court: A Brief Discussion of Some
Critiques of the Rehnquist Court and Their Implications for Administrative Law, 99 Nw.
125.
126.
127.
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firmed what Bowsher had already made apparent, that a broad
bloc on the Court was alternating between formalist and functionalist methodologies for substantive reasons.
E. PROGRESSIVE THEORY ON THE REHNQUIST COURT

By 1989, after Morrison and Mistretta, it was clear that a
substantial majority on the Court had channeled the formalist
revival to apply mainly when Congress threatened to exert political control over administrative agencies. The Rehnquist
Court's separation of powers cases have followed this pattern
since Morrison and Mistretta, especially in the few cases that
touch on the Progressive norm of apolitical administration. Most
of these cases are nondelegation opinions, all of which follow the
New Deal functionalist pattern. 132 The most recent, Whitman v.
American Trucking Association, 133 confirms that Mistretta is still
the dominant nondelegation case of the last twenty years. 134
The Rehnquist Court has decided other separation of powers cases that do not directly relate to the Progressive theory of
apolitical administration. In Clinton v. New York, 135 the Court
invalidated provisions of the Line Item Veto Act giving the
President the power to use his judgment to cancel enacted
spending appropriations. Clinton is a hard case to classify, because it forced Justices to decide between two competing attachments. The Court majority probably decided the case in the
same vein as Panama Oil, Schechter Poultry, 136 and Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 137 As those cases used originalist
non-delegation law to stop the President from exercising untrammeled power over the entire U.S. economy, perhaps Clinton
v. New York used them to stop the President from exercising untrammeled power over the entire U.S. federal budget. Justices
Scalia, O'Connor, and Breyer dissented in Clinton, on the
ground that the Court's holding threatened to resuscitate the
non-delegation doctrine. 138 Breyer and O'Connor probably voted
U. L. REV. 369, 381 (2004).
132. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996); Touby v. United States, 500
U.S. 160 (1991); Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989).
133. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). Justice Thomas concurred in Whitman to signal his interest
in reconsidering whether the Court's nondelegation doctrine is correct, but no one else
joined this original-intent concurrence.
134. Consider Gary Lawson's interpretation of the case, supra note 68, at 328-29.
135. 524 u.s. 417 (1998).
136. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
137. 343 u.s. 579 (1952).
138. Cite Clinton Steven Calabresi and Michael Rappaport agree with Breyer,
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as they did because they support wide delegations on Progressive and functionalist grounds; Scalia voted with them because
he opposes judge-made all-the-circumstances tests and the nondelegation doctrine requires such a test. 139
Separately, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, a six-vote majority
of the Rehnquist Court struck down a federal securities law that
required the federal courts to reopen final judgments entered
before the law's enactment and to apply new and retroactive
rules to the reopened cases. 140 Plaut falls in the same line as the
reasoning of the Northern Pipeline plurality: Both used formalism to stop Congress from threatening what every Justice except
Justice Stevens agreed was a threat to the autonomy and longrange interests of the Article III courts.
The Rehnquist Court has handed down several opinions in
appointments clause cases. One is clearly formalist, 141 while
three opinions are hard to classify as formalist or functionalist. 142
These decisions, however, are all rather peripheral in relation to
the themes considered in this article. None challenged the constitutional status of an administrative law judge who has not been
appointed directly by the President, an agency head, or a court.
When such a challenge arises, the judge in question may lose his
job under Buckley. If Buckley controls, that unlucky administrative job will lose his job. 143 But then again, if the Court follows its
track record over the last 30 years, surely it will limit Buckley as
Thomas limited Northern Pipeline, non-delegation cases have
limited Chadha, and Morrison limited Bowsher. 144
O'Connor, and Scalia that Clinton raises important non-delegation questions-they are
enthusiastic about the decision for that reason. See Steven G. Calabresi, Separation of
Powers and the Centrality of Clinton v. City of New York, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 77 (2004),
and Michael Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A
New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City of
New York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265 (2001).
139. See supra note 113.
140. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
141. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997) (using a bright-line formalist
test to hold military judges on the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals to be inferior
officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause).
142. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994) (holding that commissioned
military officers do not need to be re-appointed consistent with the Appointments Clause
to serve as military trial judges); Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S.
868 (1991) (holding the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to be a "Court of Law" competent
to appoint inferior officers under the Appointments Clause); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654 (1988) (holding the independent counsel to be an inferior officer and not a principal
officer within the meaning of the Appointments Clause).
143. See supra part II.B.
144. The D.C. Circuit anticipated the suggestion in text in Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d
1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000), when it upheld the constitutionality of an FDIC ALJ appointment
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The last Rehnquist Court separation of powers case, however, confirms that a broad bloc on the Rehnquist Court continues to rely on Progressive theory to decide the separation of
powers cases that directly threaten administrative agencies. 145 In
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Congress established a review
board, composed of members of Congress, to oversee the commission that supervised Dulles and National Airports near
Washington, D.C. This commission was composed of federal,
state, and District of Columbia officials, but the Court likened it
to an ordinary federal agency. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Stevens called it a "non-political, independent authority." 146
The enabling statute allowed Congressmen sit in review and
management of the airport commission's functions. 147
Stevens relied on Progressive administrative theory more
explicitly than any other case considered thus far. Stevens chose
to apply original-intent formalism precisely because the MW AA
scheme threatened to compromise agency autonomy. He offered
an example: If the act under challenge were not invalidated, he
worried, it would "enable [Congress] or its agents to retain control, outside the ordinary legislative process, of the activities of
state grant recipients char~ed with executing virtually every aspect of national policy." 14 To prevent this possibility, Stevens
applied Chadha and Bowsher in the alternative. If the review
board's functions were legislative, its structure violated Chadha
because the board did not follow bicameralism and presentment;
if those functions were executive, the board's structure violated
Bowsher because members of Congress could not perform executive functions. Justice Stevens thus used original-intent formalism to stop an act from "provid[ing] a blueprint for extensive
expansion of the legislative power beyond its constitutionally
confined role." 149

by construing Buckley's test for distinguishing between "officers" and "employees" so
narrowly that the AU was a mere employee, outside the coverage of the appointments
clause.
145. 501 U.S. 252,257,260-61 (1991).
146. Seeid. at274-76.
147. !d. at 275.
148. !d. at 277.
149. /d. Justice Stevens wrote the Court opinion for himself and Justices Blackmun
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter. Justice White, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Jus:
lice Marshall dissented on New Deal functionalist grounds.
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III. ALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS OF SEPARATION
OF POWERS LAW ON THE BURGER AND
REHNQUIST COURTS
This account may not explain the specific beliefs and behavior of every Justice on the Court, and it may not explain stray
cases like Clinton v. City of New York or Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm. All the same, it does explain how the late Burger Court
and the Rehnquist Court have behaved as groups. In addition,
different Justices could have seen the issues differently and still
contributed to the same overarching pattern. If one judges Chief
Justice Burger by his opinions in Chadha and Bowsher, he
seemed to believe there was no contradiction whatsoever between the Court's New Deal functionalist and its original-intent
formalist cases. 150 If one parses Justice Stevens' Court opinion in
Washington Airports, he seems quite aware he is using originalintent formalism to dispose of the law while he is using Progressive ideas about administration to settle the merits. At the other
extreme, it is reported that then-Justice Rehnquist authored the
separation of powers sections of the Court's per curiam opinion
in Buckley. 151 While an Associate Justice, Rehnquist wrote other
opinions unusually sympathetic to original-intent formalism. 152
Perhaps Rehnquist did not take Progressive ideas about apolitical administration as seriously as his colleagues. Perhaps he used
them in Buckley to convince his colleagues to join an otherwise
strikingly formalist and novel opinion, and bowed to the inevitable later as Chief Justice, when it became clear that no one except Justice Scalia was interested in applying original-intent formalism on a consistent basis. Yet even if different Justices took
different views about the Progressive theory of apolitical administration, all behaved as if this theory commanded the respect of
most of the Justices on the Court.
When it applies, this indirect Progressive connection may
provide the most accurate description and predictor of the Supreme Court's separation of powers decisions to date. One al150. Justice Kennedy's Court opinion in Loving v. United States suggests he may
view separation of powers as harmoniously as Chief Justice Burger did. See 517 U.S. 748,
757-58 (1996) (declaring, in a nondelegation case doing nothing to reconsider the deference in the Court's nondelegation law, "By allocating specific powers and responsibilities
to a branch fitted to the task, the Framers created a National Government that is both
effective and accountable.").
151. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 396 (1979)
152. For example, Rehnquist proposed to revitalize the nondelegation doctrine in a
concurring opinion in Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Amer. Petroleum lnst., 448 U.S.
607 (1980).
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ternative, suggested most prominently by Thomas Merrill, holds
that the Court has pursued a program of judicial restraint. While
Merrill proposed this thesis as an inductive, post hoc rationalization of the Court's work and disclaimed any intention to propose
it as a positive explanation, it still deserves consideration as a
positive explanation. 153 According to this explanation, moderate
or conservative Justices may feel a tension between originalism
and judicial restraint. While they may be sympathetic to originalism generally, they prefer not to use originalism to invalidate
acts of Congress unless the constitutional provisions at issue are
unmistakably clear. 154 This explanation certainly comports with
what we know about many of the Justices in the controlling
bloc-at a minimum, Stewart, Burger, Blackmun, Powell,
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, and Kennedy. During the relevant time frame, these Justices tended to be soft originalists,
comfortable conducting aggressive judicial review only when
constitutional text gave them a bright-line constitutional test. 155
At the same time, this originalist/judicial-restraint explanation cannot explain all of the features of the controlling bloc's
behavior. When laws threatened the idea of apolitical administration, these Justices were much more activist than the judicialrestraint hypothesis suggests. In particular, these Justices were
willing to enforce in quite activist fashion Article I, II, and III's
vesting clauses, which are ~uite open-ended and indeterminate
as constitutional clauses go 56 -even if they would have shied
away from enforcing the same language in nondelegation cases
and other cases reinforcing the apolitical administrative model.
Chadha illustrates. The majority decided the case under the
rather specific bicameralism and presentment clauses. To do so,
however, the Court first needed to find that the legislative veto
was an exercise of legislative power. Chief Justice Burger shoehorned the power to suspend the deportation of aliens into the
153. See Merrill, supra note 71, at 228.
154. See id. at 250. I am grateful to Joel Goldstein for persuading me to consider this
possibility.
155. See Young, supra note 2 at 625-42.
156. For example, Adrian Vermeule and Eric Posner have made a not-implausible
argument that the term. "legislative power" in Article l's vesting clause sanctions any
grant of statutory authonty from Congress to the President. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002). Original-meamng scholars have contested this view. See Lawson, supra note 68; Larry Alexander & Sa1knshna Prakash, Reports of the Non-delegation Doctrine's Death Are Greatly
Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 129? (2003). Even so, Vermeu1e and Posner's interpretatiOn IS hard to refute If one starts With a presumption against constraining constitutional
clauses broadly absent clear proof to the contrary.

436

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 21:405

"legislative Power" when exercised by Congress-even though
he called the same power "executive" when exercised by the Attorney General. 157 (For good measure, Justice Powell concurred
separately to shoehorn the veto into the open-ended judiciary
vesting clause, on the ground that the reversal of the Attorney
General's suspension was inherently "judicial. " 158 ) In short, Progressive ideas about apolitical administration seem to have encouraged Justices to be confident enough to be activist when
constitutional text could not.
Another alternative explanation holds that the Court shifts
between methodologies to divide government and protect individual freedom. Thomas Merrill and Elizabeth Magill have considered this possibility (although, as with the previous possibility,
both raise it conceptually and normatively but not descriptively).159 In a recent article, Magill argues that "differing approaches" to separation of powers law all "serve the same overarching goal: cabining the exercise of state power by fragmenting
that power among three distinct and potent branches of government."160 It would not be surprising if the Justices in the controlling bloc cite diffusion-of-powers concerns, but these concerns
cannot justify the Court's track record by themselves. The Justices in this bloc worry about diffusion of power when Congress
threatens to exercise several powers at once, but not when bureaucrats pose a similar threat. This insight also explains why the
Court tries to reconcile New Deal functionalism and originalintent formalism on the ground that the latter applies only when
Congress "usurps" or "aggrandizes" the prerogatives of the
agencies and the other branches of the government. 161 Congressional aggrandizement is especially dangerous because, from the
Progressives' point of view, it is the "political" branch par excellence.
Others might question whether Progressive ideas are too far
out of vogue for judges and lawyers to take them seriously 80
years later. Elizabeth Magill has criticized this article's interpretation on that ground. The "serious skepticism of agency decisionmaking that is now reflected in administrative law doc157. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952,953 n.16 (1989).
158. See id. at 964 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
159. See Merrill, supra note 71, at 228,251.
160. M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers
Law, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 603,607-08 (2001).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); CFTC v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833 (1986).
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trines," she argues, makes it implausible to think that courts subscribe to Progressive ideas about administration in their constitutional docket. 162 Magill refers here to the requirements of noticeand-comment rulemaking, which force regulators to be transparent about the choices they make when they promulgate legislative rules/ 63 and the "hard look" doctrine, which forces agencies
164
to identify sensitive legislative policy judgments they make.
These doctrines arose in the 1970s, during an era in which conservative public-choice economists and liberal federal judges
both suspected that agencies were captured by the interests they
were supposed to be regulating. 165 One might also raise similar
objections regarding the Chevron doctrine, which instructs
courts to defer to agencies' reasonable interpretations of their
organic statutes except when the statutory language clearly requires a different result. 166 The Chevron doctrine, one might argue, shows that conservatives want to transfer the power to construe broad delegations from independent agencies to the
President. 167 In each of these subconstitutional administrativelaw doctrines, the broad coalitions in the constitutional separation of powers cases dissolve and more familiar conservativeliberal divisions resurface. The conservatives support executive
and agency powers, while the liberals remain skeptical of agencies and prefer vigorous judicial review.
These objections fairly describe the surface of administrative law now, but it is crucial to put the relevant doctrines in
their proper, subconstitutional perspective. These specific disagreements play out within the context of a broader institutionalist agreement about the Progressive theory of apolitical administration. Contemporary judicial conservatives and liberals
may harbor doubts about Progressive administrative theory, but
they agree with it and with each other far more than they agree

162. Magill, supra note 10, at 71 n.l01 (2004). I am grateful not only to Professor
Magill but also to John Griesbach and Sai Prakash for encouraging me to address the
objections presented in this paragraph.
163. See Conn. Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Gary Lawson identifies the connection between notice-and-comment requirements and the skepticism of which Professor Magill speaks in GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw 254-65 (3rd ed. 2004 ).
164. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1982); see also LAWSON, supra note 163, at 536-43.
. 165. See, e.g., LAWSON, supra note 163, at 9; see also id. at 257 (section on rise of nolice-and-comment rulemaking procedures in chapter 3).
166. See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
167. The idea behind this criticism is laid out well in Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996).
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with the political theory that informs the original and formalist
Constitution. With the possible exception of Justice Thomas, all
the Justices accept that the agencies should or inevitably will get
broad delegations from Congress. 168 With the possible exceptions of Thomas and Scalia, all accept that agencies should or inevitably will get the power to grosecute and adjudicate along
with those rulemaking powers. 1 With the same possible exceptions, all accept that agencies are generally better off when not
directly supervised by members of Congress, who are more parochial and political and less cognizant of the national interest
than the President. To be sure, all of these Justices are somewhat
skeptical about the Progressive blueprint. They all worry that
capture problems corrupt the Progressive ideal of apolitical administration, and then fall out disagreeing about whether the
President or the courts can better mitigate the capture problem.
Even so, it is also telling that these normative debates are waged
in the trenches of administrative law's subconstitutional doctrines, not constitutional separation of powers. With the possible
exceptions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, everyone on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts has agreed that the Progressive approach was more or less inevitable. They disagree about how to
fix some of that approach's side effects.
Finally, it is worth noting that this Article's thesis can explain some otherwise strange puzzles about the Court's behavior. For instance, it explains why the Court sanctioned giveaways
of Article III powers in Thomas v. Union Carbide and CFTC v.
Schor. The Court prevented similar giveways in Northern Pipeline and Plaut but in Thomas and Schor, as Steven Calabresi has
observed, "[b]y claiming power to set up non-life tenured, nonArticle III tribunals to hear core federal cases, Congress directly
diminishe[ d] the power of the Article III courts to perform their
core function." 17°Calabresi has identified a strange puzzle, which
is explained by "institutionalist" ideas about judicial power: The
control group on the Burger Court did not understand the Article III courts' institutional interests as Calabresi does (or as the
framers probably did), but rather as the Progressives did. Under
the Progressive theory of apolitical administration, better not to
distract federal judges with questions of pesticide or futures law;
far more preferable for courts to leave such technical questions
to administrative experts, and focus their attention elsewhere.
168.
169.
170.

See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 89-90, 117 and accompanying text.
Calabresi, supra notes 138, at 81.
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IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW AND
THE LEGACY OF THE REHNQUIST COURT
Let us conclude by considering how this interpretation affects our perceptions of the Rehnquist Court. Of course, the
conclusions in this Part are provisional because of the "blind
men and the elephant" problem: What passes as an accurate explanation of separation of powers law may seem a gross overgeneralization as applied to free speech, privacy, or federalism.
Nevertheless, it is striking that, in a first-rank area of constitutional law, everyone on the Court except Justice Thomas and
sometimes Justice Scalia used two sharply different methodologies to reinforce a Progressive/New Deal understanding of government structure. This pattern may call into question many portraits of the Rehnquist Court.
One dominant theme in the retrospectives written thus far
holds that the Rehnquist Court has been a strongly conservative
Court. The more hostile reviews suggest that that the Rehnquist
Court has been "conservative, not in the sense that it is following
conservative judicial principles, but rather ... in the sense that it
is animated by the right-wing political agenda." 171 More sympathetic interpretations cast doubt on whether its conservative developments are illegitimate. For example, John McGinnis has
suggested that the Rehnquist Court has drawn on broad ideas
shared by conservative elites during the 1970s and 1980s in the
same indirect manner in which the late Warren Court and Justice Brennan's wing on the Burger Court drew on New Deal and
Great Society trends among liberal elites. 172
The Rehnquist Court's track record in separation of powers
cases belies both of these interpretations. It does not by itself refute either interpretation, but it does identify strong limits on the
extent to which the Rehnquist Court has been politically conservative. The Progressive theory of apolitical administration has
171. Erwin Chcmerinsky, The Rehnquist Court & Justice: An Oxymoron?, 1 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 37, 37 (1999); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, The Rehnquist Court:
Some More or Less Historical Comments, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: A
RETROSPECfiVE 143, 151-52 (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002) (assuming that the Court is in
some respects an "obviously a conservative Court," and rejecting as "surely a mirage"
the suggestion that the Rchnquist Court's decisions are politically neutral); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative Paths" of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002). See generally DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE
MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1992); STANLEY H. FRIEDELBAUM,
THE REHNQUIST COURT: IN PURSUIT OF JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (1994).
172. See McGinnis, supra note 5, at 498-507. See generally KENNETH W. STARR,
FIRST AMONG EQUALS: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE (2002).
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been conventional wisdom among legal elites in this country
since at least the middle of the twentieth century. During the
1980s and 1990s, Justices Scalia and Thomas and many younger
conservative constitutional-law academics developed a comprehensive original-meaning critique of separation of powers, encouraged in large part by precedents like Buckley and Chadha. 173
That critique, however, seems to have had little influence on
otherwise-conservative Justices like Kennedy, O'Connor, and to
an extent Rehnquist.
To be sure, the Rehnquist Court has reached more conservative results in other areas, and an encompassing retrospective
would need to reconcile separation of powers with such areas.
But the case study presented here suggests it is important to examine whether and to what extent changes elsewhere were limited by elite conventional wisdoms on a par with the Progressive
theory of apolitical administration. For instance, as I have shown
elsewhere, academic property theory, land-use law, and land-use
scholarship stopped the Rehnquist Court from laying down anything more than extreme-case limitations on contemporary landuse regulations. 174 And as Michael Rappaport has suggested,
most of the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions are "mainly
of symbolic importance." 175 As I hope to explain in subsequent
scholarship, 176 Progressive-New Deal attitudes toward federalism
and centralized government still command enough respect
across the Rehnquist Court to have limited the scope of its federalism project.
Another common theme holds that the Rehnquist Court has
been an "activist" court. 177 Of course this theme can be hard to
engage, because the term "activist" is slippery and begs basic
questions about what counts as "sound" or "activist" interprettation. Even so, the Court's track record in separation of powers
defies the most common characterization. The Court intervened
only when Congress tried to exercise direct control over an
173. See, e.g., Arnold I. Burns & Stephen 1. Markman, Understanding Separation of
Powers, 7 PACE L. REV. 575 (1987).
174. See Claeys, supra note 113, at 199-216.
175. See Rappaport, supra note 131, at 372.
176. See Eric R. Claeys, "Sabri, Lane, and Hood: The Progressive Limits on the
Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions" (manuscript on file with author).
177. See, e.g., THOMAS KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD
TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (2004);THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT (Herman Schwartz ed., 2002); see also LARRY KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004); Larry Kramer, Foreword, We the Court, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (2001).
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agency (Washington Airports) or Article III courts (Plaut), or to
give extremely broad powers to the President (Clinton v. City of
New York). In the independent-counsel provisions in Morrison
and the Sentencing Guideline provisions in Mistretta, the Court
let pass federal laws that could plausibly have been considered
drastic changes from the status quo. In short, the Court was not
activist very often in the sense that it defied Congress's will; only
once, in Clinton, could it be said that the Court was activist in
the sense that it defied the expectations of knowledgeable legal
observers.
Indeed, separation of powers is especially telling because it
teaches as much about the Court's critics as it does about the
Court. Separation of powers provides a nice contrast to federalism, takings, and other fertile fields on the Rehnquist Court, because it blossomed, peaked, and faded about a decade before
these other fields. Buckle(; reenergized separation of powers law
as United States v. Lopez 78 did the Commerce Clause and Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council179 did the Takings Clause two
decades later. Some academics immediately reacted hostilely,
charging that the Burger Court was making "drastic changes" in
separation of powers law. 180 The academic commentary became
less critical and more accommodating in the late 1980s, as the
late Burger and early Rehnquist Court confined the originalist
revival. Some articles chided the Court for its incoherence, 181
while others benignly recast the cases to conform to ProgressiveNew Deal administrative theory. 182 In the 1990s, after it became
clear that separation of powers was no longer a growth area, the
field ceased to interest most constitutional scholars who are not
originalists. The commentary on the Rehnquist Court's federalism project, if more heated, still seems to be following the same
trend: The Rehnquist Court's early forays into federalism provoked voluminous scholarship, 183 but recent decisions favoring
184
Congress have attracted much less attention. In short, Progres178. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
179. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
180. John M. Burkoff, Appointment and Removal Under the Federal Constitution:
The Impact of Buckley v. Valeo, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1335, 1336 (1976).
181. Elliott, supra note 12; Chemerinsky, supra note 12.
182. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 12.
183. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 1; Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1052-53 (2001); Vicki C. Jackson,
Semmole Tnbe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte
Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495 (1997); Donald H. Zeigler, The New Activist Court, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
184. See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004); Nevada Dept. of Human
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sive-New Deal expectations may go a long way in shaping constitutional scholars' expectations about what counts as "proper"
adjudication and what counts as "activism" in structural constitutional law.
The separation of powers cases also correct another account
of the Rehnquist Court-the "leadership" explanation. Mark
Tushnet has suggested that one of the "largely unremarked" features of the Rehnquist Court has been that the liberal Justices
have presented a unified front on many issues. 185 He attributes
this fact to several factors- especially partisan divisions between
the traditional and movement Republicans on the Court, 186 and
Justice Stevens' "leadership" skills, 187 which he contends have
been superior to the Chief Justice's or Justice Scalia's. 188
To appreciate the more insightful aspects of Tushnet's interpretation, it helps to consider how the liberals, Tushnet's
"traditional" Republicans, and his "movement" all stand jurisprudentially in relation to each other. On large issues of constitutional structure, it does not take much leadership to convince
the liberals to hang together. In separation of powers and
probably elsewhere, they have stayed within the conventional
wisdom about separation of powers. Similarly, Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor are all much more inclined to be "led" toward the
liberals than toward the diehard conservatives. Like the liberals,
Kennedy and O'Connor assume that the country's political and
constitutional developments through the 1970s are basically legitimate and have been salutary for the country. That is why they
have voted in lockstep with the liberals in separation of powers
cases. By contrast, because Justices Scalia and Thomas are
originalists, their methodology raises unsettling questions about
the New Deal transformation in separation of powers. 189
Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
185. Mark Tushnet, Pragmatism and Judgment: A Comment on Lund, 99 Nw. U. L.
REV. 289,290 (2004).
186. MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE
fUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 69-70 (2005).
187. Tushnet, mpra note 185, at 289. That said, Tushnet does not make this leadership claim as assertively in his book as he does in the articles that led to the book. In the
book, Tushnet does not treat Stevens at length, suggesting only that Justice Stevens was
more strategic than the Chief Justice at assigning opinions to keep the moderates on
board liberal positions. See TUSHNET, supra note 186, at 86; see also id. at 112-13 (Stevens' background).
188. See TUSHNET, supra note 186, at 86 (Rehnquist's refusal to assign opinion strategically); id. at 263 (Rehnquist's unimaginative opinion writing); id. at 147-41 (Scalia's
intemperateness toward his colleagues and injudiciousness in print).
189. Again, with the exception that Scalia refuses to adopt what he understands to
be the original meaning of the non-delegation doctrine as a rule for judicial decision. See
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Finally, then, separation of powers cases confirm the last
broad portrait of the Rehnquist Court-that it is in fact an
"O'Kennedy Court." While earlier retrospectives tended to portray the struggle between the liberal and conservatives on the
Court,' 90 a consensus is now emerging that Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy are key to understanding the behavior of the
Rehnquist Court. Separation of powers cases confirm this later
consensus, supplementing it mainly to underscore how important
it is to appreciate O'Connor and Kennedy's basic jurisprudential
commitments. Some accounts suggest that O'Connor and Kennedy vote primarily in response to trends in elections or in Congress.191 Tushnet attributes their voting behavior to the fact that
they are Rockefeller Republicans, not Goldwater Republicans.192 Nelson Lund attributes O'Connor's behavior to a pragmatic jurisprudential streak. 193 Thomas Keck suggests that
O'Connor and Kennedy are trying to reconcile a tension between judicial conservatives' commitment to "restraint and [a]
New Right commitment to limited government." 194 While all of
these accounts are largely accurate, none gives enough due to
the fact that O'Connor and Kennedy subscribe to many principles of political theory and jurisprudence that lie well within the
mainstream of legal thought as marked off by the U.S. Reports
and scholarship from the legal academy.
CONCLUSION
Over the last 30 years, the Progressive theory of apolitical
administration seem to have permeated the "fundamental law"
that informs the Supreme Court's separation of powers cases.
When it applies, this theory predicts how the Court will decide
separation of powers challenges. It predicts how the Court will
decide the merits of such cases. It predicts whether the Court
will apply original-intent formalism or New Deal functionalism.
When the Court applies original-intent formalism, Progressive
supra notes 113, 138-139 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT, supra
note 177; FRIEDELBAUM, supra note 171; Richard J. Lazarus, Rehnquist's Court, 47 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 861 (2003).
191. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 71, at 628-38; Rappaport, supra note 131, at 370
(2004) (describing the O'Connor Court as "politically moderate and sensitive to its public
reputation," and "especially concerned about its political capital")
192. See TUSHNET, supra note 186, at 32,48-49.
193. See Nelson Lund, The Rehnquist Court's Pragmatic Approach to Civil Rights, 99
Nw. U. L. REV. 249,250 (2004).
194. KECK, supra note 177, at 203.
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principles explain how the Court manages to limit its originalist
holdings so as not to undermine the administrative state. Finally,
when the Court balances interests using New Deal functionalism, the same principles determine how heavily competing policy
interests hang in the functionalist balance.
This connection to Progressive political theory explains an
important puzzle in separation of powers law over the last thirty
years, but it also has important ramifications for studying the
Supreme Court generally. The separation of powers case study
presented here helps put the late Burger Court and the
Rehnquist Court in a sensible historical perspective in relation to
previous Courts. The same case study also offers useful warnings
for ongoing efforts to develop retrospectives of the Rehnquist
Court. The Rehnquist Court has been activist or conservative in
important respects. Even so, we must not forget that the
Rehnquist Court is also limited in important respects by Progressive and New Deal ideas, which continue to influence academics and lawyers' expectations about good government and
good constitutional interpretation.

